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Federal grant assistance from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is 
critical for building and sustaining preparedness in urban areas. According to the 9/11 
Commission Report, “Throughout the government, nothing has been harder for 
officials—executive or legislative—than to set priorities, making hard choices in 
allocating limited resources.” The purpose of this thesis is to explore other viable options 
for allocating grant assistance to urban areas to reduce risk. A case study of the United 
Kingdom’s grant allocation approach provides a comparative analysis for DHS funding. 
Components of the UK’s allocation model, such as directly funding public safety and 
assessing relative need, could be applied in the United States as a pilot study. Similar to 
the Department of Justice’s direct-funded, community-oriented policing program, DHS 
funding could be allocated to metropolitan statistical areas to address specific national 
threat priorities, thereby aligning funding with risk, enhancing regional collaboration, and 
leveraging limited resources.  
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Federal grant assistance from the United States Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is critical for building and sustaining preparedness in urban areas.1 The top funded 
homeland security grant program for state and local government is the Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI), which allocates funding to the nation’s largest metropolitan 
areas. In fiscal year (FY) 2015, 28 urban areas received $587 million in federal funding 
through the UASI grant program.2 From FYs 2007 to 2015, the number of eligible urban 
areas awarded homeland security funding has ranged from 25 to 64.3 The ability of local 
governments to fund homeland security programs is essential to national preparedness. 
As grant funding has fluctuated, the process of grant allocation has significant 
implications for the nation’s largest urban areas.  
The purpose of this research was to explore other viable options for allocating 
grant assistance to urban areas to reduce risk. Based on an evaluation of the process DHS 
and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) use to allocate grant funding, 
what other approaches, ideas or methods are worth considering? What options would 
help to more effectively align limited budgets with risk and priorities? This thesis 
evaluates three main areas applicable to the UASI grant allocation methodology: federal 
grant budget processes, risk allocation methods, and alternative grant allocation 
approaches.  
DHS grant funding supports a broad variety of homeland security programs that 
metropolitan regions use “to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to and recover 
                                                 
1 FEMA, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA): FY 2014 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 4, http://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1395161200285-5b07ed0456056217175fbdee28d2b06e/FY_2014_HSGP_FOA_Final.pdf. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) FY 2014 Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland Security Grant Program, Appendix A–FY 
2015 Program Allocations (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015), 31, http:// 
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1429291822887-7f203c9296fde6160b727475532c7796/FY2015HSG 
P_NOFO_v3.pdf. 
3 bParati, “The Urban Area Security Initiative Program: Historical UASI Funding 2004–2015,” 5–7, 
accessed October 20, 2015, http://bparati.com/Learn/Programs/HSGP/UASI. 
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from acts of terrorism.”4 These grant funds help define and prioritize preparedness 
through regional planning and collaboration. According to the Congressional Research 
Service, the UASI grant allocation model was revised by Congress in FY 2007 to use a 
risk-based allocation model.5 In accordance with the 9/11 Commission Report, the 
purpose was to establish a method for allocating federal funds “based on an assessment of 
threats and vulnerabilities.”6 This risk-based approach determines which urban areas are 
awarded grant funds. Although public law establishes the criteria for federal grant 
allocations, DHS and FEMA determine the process to allocate funding. The process to 
allocate funds, however, has not been validated by technical experts outside of DHS and 
does not take into consideration differences in vulnerability.7 Therefore, for grant risk 
allocation purposes, differences among urban area vulnerabilities are not included in the 
DHS grant allocation determination. Of particular concern is how well DHS funding 
aligns with risk, needs, and national priorities.  
A case study of the United Kingdom’s grant allocation approach for law 
enforcement demonstrates how DHS grant funding could be allocated differently in the 
United States. Based on the extensive terrorism cases the United Kingdom has 
experienced, its funding model provides insight into how it has been able to allocate 
resources over a prolonged period of changing threats.8 Various components of the UK 
grant allocation system could be instituted in the United States to help align threats, 
budgets, and national priorities with risk. For example, the United Kingdom uses a 
formula allocation process that includes factors based on relative need and work load 
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland 
Security Grant Program (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015), 2, http:// 
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1429291822887-7f203c9296fde6160b727475532c7796/FY2015H 
SGP_NOFO_v3.pdf. 
5 Shawn Reese and Steven Maguire, Distribution of Homeland Security Grants in FY2007 and P.L. 
110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act (CRS Report No. RL34181) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2009), CRS-6, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL34181.pdf. 
6 Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 396. 
7 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010), 72. 
8 Paul Wilkinson, Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack since 9/11 
(London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2007), 31. 
 xvii 
between agencies, which ensures a more equitable distribution of funds for local 
governments with different levels of capabilities. The UK’s grant allocation model also 
funds specifically targeted activities, such as counter terrorism.9  
Although the United Kingdom does not have an overarching homeland security 
office, the UK Police Allocation Formula Working Group oversees modifications to its 
grant allocation model.10 Funding is provided directly to police agencies instead of 
through programs administered by state agencies. This direct funding reduces the 
administrative burden on the grantee and streamlines the allocation process. The 
Department of Justice (DOJ) Community Oriented Policing Program is an example of a 
grant program in the United States that provides direct funding to law enforcement for the 
specific purpose of community policing. A pilot of this program, modeled after the UK 
and DOJ programs, could be tested for applicability and effectiveness in the United States 
to directly allocate grants that target specific terrorism activities.  
Recommendations presented in this thesis are some approaches that could be 
applied to improve the DHS and FEMA grant allocation process. First, validating the 
weighting factors used to determine the urban area risk rankings through an independent 
peer review will ensure funding allocations are aligned with risk. Second, providing more 
transparency into the threat and vulnerability assessment process will assure urban areas 
that their relative risk rankings reflect the latest threat information and help provide a 
better overall understanding of resource gaps. Using expert peer reviews to validate the 
critical asset criteria and development process will result in better risk management and 
resource allocation decisions. Lastly, evaluating the direct allocation of funding for urban 
areas based on the UK model may help align needs more effectively with funding to 
enhance program capabilities. This approach could help provide a flexible grant 
allocation model to address the evolving threat environment. The grant funding process 
                                                 
9 The Minister of State Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, House of Commons: Written Statement 
(HCWS129) (2014) (Written Statement made by The Minister of State for Policing, Criminal Justice and 
Victims (Mike Penning)) Police Grant Report England and Wales 2015/16, 3, http://www.parliament.uk/ 
documents/commons-vote-office/December%202014/17%20December/12-Home-PoliceGrant.pdf. 
10 United Kingdom Home Office, “Crime and Policing: Guide to the Police Allocation Formula,” 
March 26, 2013, 2, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/guide-to-the-police-allocation-formula. 
 xviii 
would be more efficient, if a layer of program administration were removed from the 
process, and funding were applied directly to the metropolitan statistical area. Addressing 
these issues will help urban areas better understand the grant allocation process to build 




Federal grant assistance from the United States Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) is critical for building and sustaining preparedness in urban areas.1 In fiscal year 
(FY) 2015, 28 urban areas received $587 million in federal funding through the Urban 
Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program.2 From FYs 2007 to 2015, the number of 
eligible urban areas awarded homeland security funding has ranged from 25 to 64.3 
According to the Congressional Research Service:  
State and local governments have primary responsibility for most 
domestic public safety functions. When facing difficult fiscal conditions, 
state and local governments may reduce resources allocated to public 
safety and, consequently, homeland security preparedness, due to 
increasing pressure to address tight budgetary constraints and fund 
competing priorities.4  
The ability of local governments to fund homeland security programs is essential 
to national preparedness. Consequently, as the grant funding has fluctuated among urban 
areas, the process of grant allocation has significant implications for the nation’s largest 
urban areas.  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “Throughout the government, nothing 
has been harder for officials—executive or legislative—than to set priorities, making hard 
                                                 
1 FEMA, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA): FY 2014 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 4, http://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/1395161200285-5b07ed0456056217175fbdee28d2b06e/FY_2014_HSGP_FOA_Final.pdf. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) FY 2014 Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland Security Grant Program, Appendix A–FY 
2015 Program Allocations (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2015), 31, http:// 
www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1429291822887-7f203c9296fde6160b727475532c7796/FY2015HSGP_ 
NOFO_v3.pdf. 
3 bParati, “The Urban Area Security Initiative Program: Historical UASI Funding 2004–2015,” 5–7, 
accessed October 20, 2015, http://bparati.com/Learn/Programs/HSGP/UASI. 
4 William L. Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015 Appropriations (CRS Report No. 
R43796) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 74, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/home 
sec/R43796.pdf. 
 2 
choices in allocating limited resources.”5 This concern highlights the main question of 
how to allocate limited resources to reduce risk. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 
authorized the expansion of federal assistance for local government preparedness 
programs.6 In 2007, this act, as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53 (9/11 Act), included 
changes based on the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and specified risk 
criteria for allocating grant funding.7 Although public law establishes the criteria for 
federal grant allocations, the DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) determine the process to allocate funding.  
Eligible metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), as defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget, depend on federal grant assistance to implement regional 
homeland security programs.8 This funding supports a broad variety of homeland 
security programs that metropolitan regions use to prevent, prepare, mitigate, respond to, 
and recover from terrorist and natural hazard events.9 These grant funds help define and 
prioritize preparedness through regional planning and collaboration. 
Given the ongoing federal budget deficit and the evolving threat environment, 
how homeland security funds are allocated is important to federal, state, and local 
governments to address risk. However, the process to allocate funds has not been 
validated by technical experts outside of DHS and does not take into consideration 
                                                 
5 Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 
The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004), 395. 
6 Shawn Reese, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A Summary and 
Issues for the 111th Congress (CRS Report No. R40246) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2009), 3, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40246.pdf. 
7 Shawn Reese and Steven Maguire, Distribution of Homeland Security Grants in FY2007 and P.L. 
110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act (CRS Report No. RL34181) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2009), CRS–6.  
8 Jennifer D. Williams and James R. Riehl, Metropolitan Area Designations by OMB: History, Current 
Definitions, and Uses (CRS Report No. RL32675) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
November 15, 2004), CRS–2, http://congressionalresearch.com/RL32675/document.php?study=Metro 
politan+Area+Designations+by+OMB+History+Current+Definitions+and+Uses. 
9 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland 




differences in regional vulnerability.10 Although FEMA provides a broad overview of its 
allocation methods and data sources, it does not provide the specific details of analyses to 
local decision makers. MSA-eligible agencies are not provided the details on how the 
grant allocation process is applied.  
National reports, such as the 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 
provide details on national threats and emerging trends, as well as identify budget drivers 
but do not specifically prioritize DHS goals with federal budgets.11 According to 
congressional testimony from Henry H. Willis, “aligning budgets with strategic guidance 
and risk management will make the Department more effective.”12 When MSAs are 
awarded grant funds, large differences occur between individual MSA allocation levels.13 
These differences in funding levels affect the capabilities of the lower funded urban areas 
to implement homeland security programs. Considering that the grant allocation process 
has not been independently validated, how should grant funding be allocated to maximize 
effectiveness? The focus of the research addresses the following areas: 
• Public law criteria 
• Budget processes and methods 
• Risk allocation model 
• Alternative allocation approaches 
Ideally, the process to allocate limited resources is to determine the priorities, 
evaluate the risk, and develop an independent, validated allocation process. In the last 
several years, FEMA has proposed changes to consolidate the grant assistance programs; 
                                                 
10 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2010), 72. 
11 Stakeholder Perspectives on Priorities for the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of the Committee on Homeland Security 
House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 2 (2014) (testimony of Honorable Jeff Duncan), 7, http://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg90882/html/CHRG-113hhrg90882.htm. 
12 Stakeholder Perspectives on Priorities for the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of the Committee on Homeland Security 
House of Representatives, 113th Cong., 2 (2014) (testimony of Henry H. Willis), 29, http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg90882/html/CHRG-113hhrg90882.htm. 
13 Department of Homeland Security, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) FY 2014 Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland Security Grant Program, Appendix A–FY 
2015 Program Allocations, 31. 
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however, Congress consistently denies the revisions. Consequently, the challenge for 
DHS and FEMA is determining what other approaches are available to build cooperative 
capacity without revising public law. This thesis offers other available options through 
revisions to the current grant system. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore other viable options to allocate grant 
assistance to urban areas to reduce risk. Based on the evaluation of the process DHS and 
FEMA use to allocate grant funding, what other approaches, ideas or methods are worth 
considering? What options would help to align limited budgets more effectively with risk 
and priorities?  
C. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
To answer these questions, the subsequent chapters explore the grant allocation 
process in further detail. Chapter II provides an evaluation of the current literature 
divided into three separate categories: federal grant budget processes, risk-based 
allocation methods, and alternative grant allocation approaches. Chapter III provides a 
background analysis of the federal grant assistance process and homeland security grant 
characteristics. In Chapter III, the DHS risk-based allocation formula is examined 
through a qualitative analysis. A comparative case study of the United Kingdom (UK)’s 
grant allocation formula for law enforcement is analyzed in Chapter V. Chapter VI 
concludes with recommendations to improve the grant allocation process and offers 
several alternative options. The final section of the chapter discusses areas for future 
research considerations.  
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The thesis research is exploratory and descriptive in its design. According to 
Business Research Methods, “Exploratory studies are conducted for three main reasons, 
to analyse [sic] a problem situation, to evaluate alternatives and to discover new ideas.”14 
                                                 
14 S. Sreejesh, Sanjay Mohapatra and M. R. Anusree, Business Research Methods: An Applied 
Orientation (New York: Springer, 2014), 31, (eBook), http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319005386.  
 5 
Exploratory and descriptive research is used to gain further information, background and 
insight into a specific subject and then describe the relationship of policies. The objective 
is to help explain relationships among policies to “gain deeper insights and establish 
priorities for further research.”15  
This thesis explores how the urban area grant allocation process under DHS can 
be improved. Using appreciative inquiry, this thesis evaluates what methods work well 
and can be expanded upon to build capacity. The research methodology demonstrates 
other models to allocate grant funding. The research steps are as follows: 
• To examine the current federal DHS grant assistance process; 
• To evaluate research based options; 
• To explore other approaches for grant allocation; 
• To consider “best practice” models; and 
• To develop recommendations based on revisions to the current process, 
other potential concepts and what is realistic or useful within the federal 
grant assistance framework. 
Data collection included secondary sources, discussions with practitioners in the 
field, and case study analysis. The thesis is based extensively on secondary sources of 
information, although several primary research studies are used in the analysis of data. 
The main sources of data collection for this study fall into the following classifications: 
• Government publications and reports 
• Public law and congressional testimony 
• Independent research studies 
• Federal, foreign and local government budget documents  
A case study from the United Kingdom is used to evaluate how other approaches 
to grant funding could be applied in the United States. As described in How to Research, 
“case studies are often used to illustrate problems or indicate good practices…and its 
                                                 
15 Sreejesh, Mohapatra, and Anusree, Business Research Methods: An Applied Orientation, 26. 
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linkage to a body of theory and practice in the literature.”16 The United Kingdom 
provides a comparative analysis of how funding could be allocated differently in the 
United States. Based on the extensive terrorism cases the United Kingdom has 
experienced, its funding model provides insight into how it has been able to allocate 
resources based on changing threats over a prolonged period.17  
Informal discussions with practitioners in the field provided background 
information and concerns regarding the homeland security grant allocation process, and 
its impact upon local and regional government agencies. This insight helped guide the 
direction of the thesis research. One consistent theme mentioned by homeland security 
managers is how the process of grant allocation is somewhat a “black box,” and what is 
included in determining relative risk rankings among urban areas is not clearly 
understood. In summary, the methodology of the research uses policy analysis to evaluate 
program information, explore the associated grant allocation issues, and describe new 
potential approaches for consideration.  
                                                 
16 Loraine Blaxter, Christina Hughes, and Malcolm Tight, How to Research, 4th. ed. (Buckingham and 
Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2001), 73. 
17 Paul Wilkinson, Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack since 9/11 
(London and New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2007), 31. 
 7 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review summarizes relevant knowledge regarding the allocation of 
grant funding awarded through DHS’s UASI program. The literature reviewed comes 
primarily from government sources that evaluated the DHS grant allocation methods. 
Although significant research has been conducted to explore the thesis topic, the 
literature review discusses only the main research findings. This literature review 
explores three main areas applicable to the UASI grant allocation methodology: federal 
grant budget processes, risk allocation methods, and alternative grant allocation 
approaches. 
A. FEDERAL GRANT BUDGET PROCESSES 
The main source of budget and grant literature research comes from government 
documents and reports covering federal appropriations, funding methodology, and risk 
management. The extensive sources of secondary research, especially from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
provide details on the status of homeland security grant programs, funding cycles, and 
future considerations. Additional explanatory research was obtained through the review 
of DHS and FEMA grant guidance, public law, and congressional testimony. 
Since 9/11, the process for allocating homeland security funding has evolved. 
According to the CRS, the expansion of grant funding awarded to urban areas increased 
with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296).18 This act was amended 
in 2007 to implement recommendations of the 9/11 Commission.19 The 9/11 Commission 
Report is often cited in reports regarding the allocation of grant funding and is frequently 
used to justify the current budget methodology. According to The 9/11 Commission 
Report, “Throughout the government, nothing has been harder for officials—executive or 
                                                 
18 Reese, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A Summary and 
Issues for the 111th Congress, 3. 
19 Reese and Maguire, Distribution of Homeland Security Grants in FY2007 and P.L. 110-53, 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act, CRS–6. 
 8 
legislative—than to set priorities, making hard choices in allocating limited resources.”20 
According to the CRS, the UASI grant allocation model was revised by Congress to use a 
risk-based allocation model.21 In accordance with The 9/11 Commission Report, the 
purpose was to establish a method for allocating federal funds “based on an assessment of 
threats and vulnerabilities.”22 This risk-based approach determines which urban areas are 
awarded grant funds. 
Various researchers have questioned the cost effectiveness of homeland security 
grant funding in reducing national risk. For example, according to John Mueller and 
Mark G. Stewart, “Homeland security expenditures invested in a wide range of more cost 
effective risk reduction programs … would probably result in far more significant 
benefits to society.”23 However, according to Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, “In a 
very real sense, city security is a core national security issue but a local responsibility; in 
the United States, American cities and counties control and finance the police, fire, public 
health, and emergency services most needed in the face of terrorist attacks.”24 According 
to a 2013 CRS report, DHS funding only represents a small portion of overall state and 
local government expenditures, estimated at a little more than one percent of total public 
safety spending.25  
The paradox identified in the literature is whether local governments could 
continue to support homeland security programs without federal grant assistance. 
According to a 2014 CRS report, “When facing difficult fiscal conditions, state and local 
                                                 
20 Kean and Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report, 395. 
21 Reese and Maguire, Distribution of Homeland Security Grants in FY2007 and P.L. 110-53, 
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act, CRS–6.  
22 Kean and Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report, 396. 
23 John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and 
Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 182. 
24 Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, “All Terrorism is Local: Resources, Nested Institutions, and 
Governance for Urban Homeland Security in the American Federal System,” Political Research Quarterly 
63 (2009): 496, doi:10.1177/1065912909334426. 
25 William L. Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations (CRS Report No. 
R43147) (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 59, http://defense-legislation.blogspot. 
com/2013/08/department-of-homeland-security-fy2014.html. 
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governments may reduce resources allocated to public safety and, consequently, 
homeland security preparedness.”26 This point of view is validated from local urban 
areas. For example, according to the Indianapolis Director of Public Safety David Riggs, 
“When the city lost UASI funding … we just could not sustain our operations and had to 
make tough decisions in order to keep the most critical operations active.”27 Therefore, 
the consensus from state and local governments is that the process for determining and 
allocating federal assistance is essential for homeland security preparedness. 
Considering the importance of homeland security funding to local governments, 
some of the central issues regarding homeland security grant funding seem to be left 
unaddressed. For example, what type of grant is the most effective in allocating funding 
and what changes to policy should be considered? According to CRS, DHS grant funding 
is considered block grant funding, which is a funding mechanism Congress uses to assist 
state and local government to address broad public purposes.28 According to CRS, 
“accountability for results can be difficult when funding is allocated based on formulas 
and population counts rather than performance or meeting demonstrated need.”29 A gap 
in the research literature is whether further evaluation should be considered for other 
funding approaches that would streamline the grant management, allocation, and 
reporting process.  
The issue of funding methods also connects to the concern regarding aligning 
grant funding with national priorities. According to Shawn Reese, a CRS analyst in 
emergency management and homeland security policy: 
Congress and policymakers are responsible for funding homeland security 
priorities. These priorities need to exist, to be clear and cogent, in order for 
                                                 
26 Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015 Appropriations, 74. 
27 Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives. Stakeholder Assessments of the 
Administration’s National Preparedness Grant Program Proposal, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security House 
of Representatives, Serial No. 113-66, 113th Cong., 2 (2014), 36, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
113hhrg89446/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg89446.pdf. 
28 Robert Jay Dilger and Eugene Boyd, Block Grants: Perspectives and Controversies (CRS Report 
No. R40486) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R40486.pdf. 
29 Ibid., 11.  
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funding to be most effective. Presently, as DHS itself has stated, homeland 
security is not funded on clearly defined priorities. In an ideal scenario, 
there would be a clear definition of homeland security, and a consensus 
about it; as well as prioritized missions, goals, and activities.30  
How well DHS funding aligns with risk, need, and national priorities is a concern that 
requires further study. According to a 2013 GAO report, in FYs 2013 and 2014, the 
President’s budget proposed establishing the National Preparedness Grant Program 
(NPGP), a consolidation of 16 grants into a single program to improve their effectiveness 
and reduce redundancies; however, Congress did not approve the grant consolidation 
proposal.31 Furthermore, over the last three years, congressional testimony has 
consistently challenged this consolidation request.32 
According to congressional testimony from April 2014, Chairwoman Susan W. 
Brooks, Subcommittee Member on Emergency Preparedness, Response and 
Communications, questioned the consolidation of the homeland security grant programs 
in a letter to FEMA Director Craig Fugate.33 According to her letter, “Considering the 
impact this proposal would have on the way first responders receive grants to attain, 
maintain, and sustain core capabilities, there is no room for uncertainty.” In other words, 
without knowing exactly how the proposal will affect the current process, change is 
unlikely. Consequently, based on the literature, changing the grant process to allocate 
funding into one risk-based allocation does not appear to be a realistic option. 
                                                 
30 Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives, “Assessing DHS 10 Years Later: How 
Wisely Is DHS Spending Taxpayer Dollars? (2013) (written statement of Shawn Reese), 2, http://docs. 
house.gov/meetings/HM/HM09/20130215/100263/HHRG-113-HM09-Wstate-ReeseS-20130215.pdf. 
31 David C. Maurer, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps Are 
Needed to Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities (GAO-13-637T) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office), 6, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-637T. 
32 Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives. Stakeholder Assessments of the 
Administration’s National Preparedness Grant Program Proposal, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security House 
of Representatives, 1. 
33 Ibid., 2. 
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B. RISK-BASED ALLOCATION METHODS 
Another main area of the literature review is on risk allocation methods and 
approaches. A substantial number of research reports are written on homeland risk 
analysis and evaluation. Congress, through public law, has established the criteria for 
determining risk analysis, but how that formula is implemented determines the relative 
risk ranking of high-risk urban areas.34  
In 2008, the National Research Council (NRC) of the National Academies, a non-
profit advisory organization to the federal government, “established the Committee to 
Review the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis to assess 
how the DHS is building its capabilities in risk analysis to inform decision making.”35 In 
2010, after 15 months of evaluating the process DHS uses to allocate grant funding, the 
Committee published its results.36 According to the report, the most critical finding is 
that although the risk methodology was determined generally appropriate “for 
decomposing risk and organizing information … with the exception of risk analysis for 
natural disaster preparedness, the committee did not find any DHS risk analysis 
capabilities and methods that are yet adequate for supporting DHS decision making, 
because their validity and reliability are untested.”37 Consequently, the Committee 
recommended, “DHS should strengthen its scientific practices, such as documentation, 
validation, and peer review by technical experts.”38 Regarding homeland security grants, 
the Committee recommended: 
FEMA should undertake an external peer review by technical experts 
outside DHS of its risk-informed formulas for grant allocation to identify 
any logical flaws with the formulas, evaluate the ramifications of the 
                                                 
34 United States Code Subchapter XV-Homeland Security Grants, Section 604: Urban Area Security 
Initiative, 180. 
35 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis, 1. 
36 Ibid., vii. 
37 Ibid., 2. 
38 Ibid., 3. 
 12 
choices of weightings and parameters in the consequence formulas, and 
improve the transparency of these crude models of risk.39 
If the grant allocation approach is not validated and transparent, can grant 
measurement be determined? Transparency of the grant allocation and risk analysis 
process was frequently addressed by both the GAO and CRS reports that provided 
specific details on how threat, critical infrastructure, and risk analyses were conducted by 
DHS. The consensus was that more clarity regarding the specifics of the process would 
help decision makers to understand better how risk and grant funding is allocated. 
According to a 2007 CRS report, often cited by other sources: 
While safeguarding the intelligence, law enforcement, and other sensitive 
information weighted and analyzed through DHS’s risk methodology, 
disclosure of the mathematical equation used to determine threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence may allow all applicants and stakeholders 
to understand and have a basis to confirm or challenge the results prior to 
funds being allocated.40 
Better understanding of risk will help decision makers evaluate terrorism uncertainties, 
vulnerabilities, and resource strategies.41 
The issue of grant allocations was evaluated further in another study that 
examined homeland grant funding from the viewpoint of distributive politics. In 2010, 
University of Kansas Associate Professor Holly T. Goerdel examined the issue of using 
risk as a method of allocating grant funds.42 The study examined the political influence in 
the allocation of homeland security grant funding.43 According to Goerdel, having a risk-
based methodology to allocate funds appears generally to target funding more effectively 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 6. 
40 Todd Masse, Siobhan O’Neil, and John Rollins, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk 
Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress (CRS Report No. RL33858) 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2007), CRS–24, http://www.fas.org:8080/sgp/ 
crs/homesec/RL33858.pdf. 
41 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis, 113. 
42 Holly T. Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” Publius: The 
Journal of Federalism 43, no. 4 (2012): 605, http://publius.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/12/22/ 
publius.pjs053.abstract. 
43 Ibid., 600. 
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than formula-driven allocation methods.44 However, the key appears to be ensuring the 
process is validated and measured.45 Goerdel, although evaluating political influence in 
the grant allocation process, seems to agree with the finding from the NRC of using risk 
as an appropriate methodology. The difference between the studies, however, is that NRC 
could not confirm the DHS risk model is an acceptable methodology for terrorism risk.46 
Both studies, however, agree that a targeted risk-based approach seems more effective, 
but the process must be validated.  
In a June 2008 report, the GAO concluded that “DHS has constructed a 
reasonable methodology to assess risk and allocate funds within a given year.”47 Based 
on the GAO report, the weaknesses in the DHS risk methodology is how vulnerability is 
measured in the formula.48 According to the GAO, “DHS considered all states and urban 
areas equally vulnerable to a successful attack and assigned every state and urban area a 
vulnerability score of 1.0 in the risk model.”49 This finding was also included in the NRC 
report; however, the concern was that FEMA does not have the resources to conduct 
nationwide vulnerability analyses.50 Therefore, for grant allocation purposes, differences 
among MSA vulnerabilities are not included in the DHS grant allocation determination.  
C. ALTERNATIVE GRANT ALLOCATION APPROACHES 
Various sources of secondary literature from government reports have identified 
other potential approaches to allocating grant funding. These reports provide alternative 
models for funding homeland security programs. Several of these methods, discussed in 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 614. 
45 Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” 620. 
46 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis, 2–3. 
47 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology 
is Reasonable, but Current Version’s of Vulnerability Is Limited (GAO-08-852) (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2008), 4, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-852. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis, 72. 
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the CRS reports, include unified approaches to budgeting.51 According to a 2013 CRS 
report, “More ‘unified’ budgeting approaches could facilitate the identification of 
overlaps and gaps among agencies’ efforts; enable more deliberate assignment of roles 
and responsibilities; catalyze closer collaboration; and provide greater transparency to 
help support congressional oversight.”52 However, the willingness to make this type of 
systemic change is unlikely, when considering, for example, the difficulty FEMA has had 
in consolidating its existing grant programs.53 
Other approaches identified by the CRS in 2007 outlined various options, from 
establishing a DHS risk assessment manager to creating a risk assessment center.54 
According to the CRS, “These tasks are relatively complex and, it could be argued, 
require the formation of a group of professional methodologists whose sole function is 
risk assessment.”55 The risk analysis study conducted by the NRC in 2010 disagreed with 
idea of appointing a single risk manager, concluding that “Risk assessments are done for 
many issues. For a single entity to wisely and adequately address this broad range would 
require a large—perhaps separate—agency.”56 The NRC instead recommended as an 
alternative “the development of a multidisciplinary risk analysis staff.”57 The consensus 
from the literature is that the risk analysis process is complicated and must be well 
coordinated with stakeholders.58  
                                                 
51 Catherine Dale, Nina M. Serafino, and Pat Towell, A Unified National Security Budget? Issues for 
Congress (CRS Report No. R42997) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), 1, https:// 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42997.pdf. 
52 Dale, Serafino, and Towell, A Unified National Security Budget? Issues for Congress, 1. 
53 Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives. Stakeholder Assessments of the 
Administration’s National Preparedness Grant Program Proposal, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security House 
of Representatives, 1. 
54 Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: 
Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress, CRS–26. 
55 Ibid. 
56 National Research Council of the National Academies, Review of the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Approach to Risk Analysis, 92. 
57 Ibid., 91. 
58 Ibid., 92. 
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Reviewing the literature from other countries provides another approach for 
allocating grant funding worth examining. Based on UK government documents, 
comparative research was completed of their grant funding approaches for police 
agencies. Unlike the United States, the UK central government accounts for 76 percent of 
total police funding.59 Although not feasible for the United States, the UK’s grant 
allocation model considers work load, relative need,60 and specific targeted terrorism 
activities.61 Although the United Kingdom does not have an overarching homeland 
security office, the UK Police Allocation Formula Working Group oversees 
modifications to their grant allocation model.62 In contrast, the U.S. grant allocation 
methodology is based on a relative risk model developed by DHS and FEMA; thus, a gap 
exists in the literature regarding how a different allocation model might work in the 
United States.  
However, according to the CRS, the parliamentary system in the United Kingdom 
“influences government decisions regarding homeland security budgetary priorities 
[since] … there is no strict separation of the executive and legislative branches in the 
UK.”63 Exploring the use of some of the UK allocation methods may offer potential for 
the United States. Various components of the UK grant allocation system could be 
instituted in the United States to help align threats, budgets, and national priorities with 
risk. By providing more flexibility funded programs through the discretion of the 
homeland security secretary, further study could be initiated in the United States to 
evaluate the effectiveness of this approach.  
                                                 
59 Timothy Brain, Police Funding (England & Wales) 2011–2012 (Police Briefing Paper, No. 1) 
(Cardiff, Wales: Universities’ Police Science Institute, 2011), 2, http://www.openeyecommunications. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/UPSI-Police-Briefing-Paper-No-1-12-Aug-11.pdf. 
60 United Kingdom Home Office, “Crime and Policing: Guide to the Police Allocation Formula,” 
March 26, 2013, 1. https://www.gov.uk/guidance/guide-to-the-police-allocation-formula. 
61 The Minister of State Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, House of Commons: Written 
Statement (HCWS129), 3.  
62 United Kingdom Home Office, “Crime and Policing: Guide to the Police Allocation Formula,” 2. 
63 Kristin Archick et al., European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism (CRS 
Report No. RL33573) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), CRS–41, https://www. 
fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf. 
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In summary, the literature review provided detailed information in specific areas 
of grant management, federal budgets, risk analysis, national priorities, and funding 
allocations, but no specific viable solutions were discovered as how to align budgets 
better with priorities, risks, and performance results. The gaps in the literature are not in 
analyzing budgets, evaluating risk, or measuring performance, although more analysis is 
always useful. The gaps in the research concern the overall process of how well the 
budgets align with risk, risk aligns with grants, and grants align with national priorities 
and needs. This thesis provides further research into connecting the issues. Although no 
one solution exists, specific changes to grant allocation policies and procedures, and the 
direct allocation approach used in the United Kingdom, offers potential options for 
programs in the United States.  
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III. FEDERAL GRANT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, “In a free-for-all over money, it is 
understandable that representatives will work to protect the interests of their home states 
or districts. But this issue is too important for politics as usual to prevail. Resources must 
be allocated according to vulnerabilities.”64 How federal assistance grant funding is 
allocated affects the ability of urban areas “to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond 
to, and recover from acts of terrorism.”65 Within DHS’s federal assistance program for 
state and local preparedness, the four primary grants are the State Homeland Security 
Grant Program, the UASI, the Port Security Grant Program, and the Transit Security 
Grant Program.66 The total enacted federal budget for DHS state and local grant 
programs in FY 2014 was nearly $1.3 billion.67 Among these programs, the state 
homeland security and UASI programs represented the largest share of the grant funding, 
accounting for approximately 84 percent of the FY 2014 grant award.68 In FY 2014, the 
UASI program, with a budget of $587 million, was the highest funded program.69 
The grant funding allocation for homeland security programs is considered part of 
the discretionary budget. The discretionary budget represents funding for government 
activities, such as defense, education, transportation, and government operations.70 
According to the CRS, “Discretionary spending is not mandated by existing law and is 
thus appropriated yearly by Congress through appropriations acts.”71 As shown in Figure 
1, total grant funding represents approximately three percent of DHS’s total FY 2016 
                                                 
64 Kean and Hamilton, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 
Commission Report, 396. 
65 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2015 
Homeland Security Grant Program, 2. 
66 Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2015 Appropriations, 75–76.  
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., 76. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Jessica Tollestrup, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction (CRS Report No. 
R42388) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 1, http://www.senate.gov/CRSRep 
orts/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%260BL%2BP%3C%3B3%0A. 
71 Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations, 79. 
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budget authority of approximately $64.9 billion.72 The UASI program budget represents 
less than one percent of DHS’s total budget authority.73 These programs, however, play a 
critical role in the preparedness of state and local governments. According to the CRS:  
State and local governments have primary responsibility for most 
domestic public safety functions. When facing difficult fiscal conditions, 
state and local governments may reduce resources allocated to public 
safety and, consequently, homeland security preparedness, due to 
increasing pressure to address tight budgetary constraints and fund 
competing priorities. Since state and local governments fund the largest 
percentage of public safety expenditures, this may have a significant 
impact on the national preparedness level.74 
DHS grant funding is only a little more than one percent of annual state and local public 
safety expenditures of $218 billion.75  
Figure 1.  DHS FY 2016 Percent of Budget Authority by Organization 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2016 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 9, http://www.dhs. 
gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf. 
                                                 
72 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Budget-in-Brief Fiscal Year 2016 (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2015), 9, http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Painter, Department of Homeland Security: FY2014 Appropriations, 59.  
75 Ibid.  
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A. APPROPRIATION PROCESS 
DHS’s grant assistance programs are funded through one of 12 appropriations 
measures.76 According to the CRS, “The House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations have jurisdiction over the annual appropriations measures. Each 
committee has 12 subcommittees, and each subcommittee has jurisdiction over one 
regular annual appropriations bill that provides funding for departments and agencies 
under the subcommittees jurisdiction.”77 Consequently, a Senate and House 
subcommittee has jurisdiction over discretionary homeland security appropriations.  
The end result of this process is the annual DHS Appropriations Act, which is 
signed into law by the President. The bill establishes the total amount the state and local 
preparedness grant programs are funded. Funding for the State Homeland Security and 
UASI grant programs is allocated by two different methods. In addition to risk and need 
considerations, the State Homeland Security grant program guarantees a minimum 
allocation to all states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.78 This guarantee results 
in higher per capita grant allocations for more sparsely populated states.79 The UASI 
program allocation, on the other hand, is based on DHS risk analysis, which determines 
the urban areas that qualify for grant funding through relative risk comparisons.80 
B. HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT CHARACTERISTICS 
The process established by Congress and the DHS Secretary to allocate grant 
funding determines which urban areas are eligible for grant awards. By influencing the 
formula used to allocate funds, subcommittee members can affect the outcome through 
setting the rules as part of the governing body. How effectively stakeholders influence the 
process through their positions on committees or in leadership authority can help to 
                                                 
76 Tollestrup, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, 1.  
77 Tollestrup, The Congressional Appropriations Process: An Introduction, 1. 
78 Reese, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A Summary and 
Issues for the 111th Congress, 5.  
79 Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” 605. 
80 Reese, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A Summary and 
Issues for the 111th Congress, 5. 
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determine how well they do with funding.81 According to University of Kansas Associate 
Professor Holly T. Goerdel: 
The authorization committees for homeland security are substantively 
oriented towards issues of policy, as well as managing the authorization of 
funding for policy initiatives and programs. These committees can 
recommend policies that shape homeland security activities. Homeland 
security appropriations subcommittees also have authority to affect the 
success of policies and programs by writing appropriation checks on the 
basis of any concerns under their consideration. Therefore, changes to 
funding formulas can come about from integrated processes between 
authorization and appropriation committees.82  
Table 1 provides a comparison of homeland security grant characteristics. 
Depending on the type of grant allocation, each particular method is subject to influence. 
Table 1.   Distributive Politics and Homeland Security Grant Allocations, 
2004–6 
Homeland Security Grant Characteristics Particularistic Universal 
Legislative Benefits Narrow, exclusive, 
particularistic  
Example: polices that result 
from logrolling issues of 
interest to fewer legislators, 
such as those based on risk, 
vulnerability, past incidence  
Universal, inclusive, wide 
ranging  
Example: revenue sharing 
policies based on equal 
distribution among fifty 
states (fair sharing); per 
capita distribution 
Motivations to Secure 
Benefits 
Motivated by securing 
potentially larger piece of 
fiscal share, even if 
otherwise trading off fair-
share resources 
Prevent losing funds to 
game of narrow political 
interests; prefer strategy of 
allocation similar to 
insurance policy  
Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants (partial table). Source: 
Holly T. Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” 
Publius: The Journal of Federalism 43, no. 4 (2012): 606, http://publius.oxford 
journals.org/content/early/2012/12/22/publius.pjs053.abstract. 
                                                 
81 Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” 605. 
82 Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” 607. 
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The UASI program is a risk-based particularistic grant as opposed to the partially 
risk-based State Homeland Security grant program, which includes a revenue-sharing 
component. In comparing particularistic to universal security spending, political factors 
are more likely to dominate formula-based revenue sharing than risk-based allocations.83 
Based on Goerdel’s analysis of risk and politics of homeland security grants for the 
period of 2004 to 2006, “political will to protect more certain, universal benefits prevails 
over any risk factor, whether medium or high.”84 Consequently, without a proven system 
of risk assessment in place to offset this influence, modifications to funding formulas 
may result in misallocation.85  
C. URBAN AREAS ELIGIBLE FOR GRANTS 
As the grant allocation characteristics have changed through revisions by DHS 
and Congress, the total number of urban areas eligible to receive funding has varied by 
fiscal year. For example, in FY 2013, the total number of urban areas eligible to receive 
funding was limited to 25 through the congressional appropriations bill.86 This restriction 
reduced the DHS Secretary’s discretion to allocate funds.87 However, this cap was then 
removed from the annual appropriations bill in FY 2014, and the number of UASIs 
funded increased to 39 by the DHS Secretary.88 The FY 2015 UASI grant funded 28 
urban areas.89  
                                                 
83 Ibid., 601. 
84 Ibid., 612. 
85 Goerdel, “Politics versus Risk in Allocations of Federal Security Grants,” 619. 
86 DHS Press Office, “DHS Announces Grant Guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 Preparedness 
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87 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Homeland Security Grant Program 
(HSGP) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
2014), 3, http://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1395150571234-0b433243a3e4c6cd0a5346e807a59 
1c0/FY_2014_HSGP_FAQsFinal.pdf. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Department of Homeland Security, Funding Opportunity Announcement (FOA) FY 2014 Homeland 
Security Grant Program (HSGP) Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland Security Grant Program, Appendix A–FY 
2015 Program Allocations, 31. 
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Within the 2015 DHS Appropriations Act, specific guidance was included for the 
UASI grant allocation process. This guidance defines the scope of the award grant award 
recipients as follows: 
Consistent with the 9/11 Act, FEMA shall conduct risk assessments for the 
100 most populous metropolitan areas prior to making Urban Area 
Security Initiative (UASI) grant awards. Because most of the cumulative 
national terrorism risk to urban areas is focused on a relatively small 
number of cities, it is expected that UASI funding will be limited to urban 
areas representing up to 85 percent of risk and that resources will continue 
to be allocated in proportion to risk.90 
Based on this guidance, DHS determines which urban areas qualify for grant funds within 
the 85 percent of risk criteria. Once the UASI grant budget is enacted, the process of 
allocating grant awards to specific urban areas is completed through the DHS risk 
formula, which provides a comparison ranking of the nation’s metropolitan areas.  
As the number of funded urban areas has fluctuated, so has their ability to sustain 
their regions’ homeland security programs due to financial and budget uncertainties. This 
issue is exemplified through the congressional testimony of David Riggs, Indianapolis 
Director of Public Safety: 
When the city [Indianapolis] lost UASI funding in 2011 and in 2013 … 
we were left without the financial means to support operations. The loss of 
funding created a financial burden on a city that was already experiencing 
budget shortfalls due to a dwindling tax base and a struggling economy. 
Locally, we just could not sustain our operations and had to make some 
tough decisions in order to keep the most critical operations active. We 
also had to make some tough decisions regarding how we staffed our 
homeland security department.91  
This impact is typical of some other urban areas throughout the nation as the loss of 
funding and economic downturn has affected local government preparedness. This 
                                                 
90 “Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2015,” 54, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/CREC-2015-01-13/html/CREC-2015-01-13-pt1-PgH272-5.htm. 
91 Committee on Homeland Security House of Representatives. Stakeholder Assessments of the 
Administration’s National Preparedness Grant Program Proposal, Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security House 
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economic impact is described further in The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security 
Review: 
Since the last Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, economic 
conditions have had wide-ranging impacts across homeland security 
partners and stakeholders, affecting both daily operations and current 
investments to meet longer-term needs and challenges. For example, more 
than two-thirds of the nation’s 30 largest metro regions have not seen 
municipal government revenue return to pre-recession levels.92  
The loss of program funding has affected various local government preparedness 
programs, including regional stakeholder partnerships. The grant funding provides an 
opportunity for stakeholders to work together to address homeland security issues.  
Maintaining and establishing collaboration is a key component of the UASI grant 
assistance program. For example, according to Erica Chenoweth and Susan E. Clarke, 
“Even though local officials share concerns for security and well-being, the constraints 
on mobilizing and sustaining enough cooperation to act on homeland security needs are 
significant.”93 Funding and then defunding urban areas changes the dynamics within an 
urban area and also its ability to engage in future partnerships. For example, the UASI 
program grant requirements mandate the sustainment of an urban area working group to 
provide policy oversight for regional partnerships.94 According to Erica Chenoweth and 
Clarke, “Since no single actor enjoys sufficient authority or resources to compel action, 
local politics must construct coalitions using a combination of incentives, mandates and 
regulations.”95 Consequently, the uncertainty of funding affects political support among 
partners at the local government level. According to Edmund C. Stazyk and Holly T. 
Goerdel:  
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Political support is extremely valuable to public organizations. Political 
support functions as a resource … to the extent that a dominant coalition 
of politicians can influence and determine an organization’s goals and 
actions.96  
Maintaining multiagency support within an urban area for homeland security programs is 
critical to its effectiveness. Political support from within the coalition of local 
governments that represent the urban area can help leverage limited UASI funding. Since 
the UASI program mandates collaboration among local government agencies, the funding 
sustains regional preparedness planning.97 The reliability of the process for determining 
federal assistance to urban areas is essential for homeland security preparedness.  
D. BLOCK GRANTS 
The State Homeland Security and UASI grants to state and local governments are 
considered block grants, which is a funding mechanism Congress uses to assist state and 
local governments to address broad public purposes.98 According to the CRS, the 
following criteria are used in determining block grants: 
• Program funds are typically distributed using a formula that may 
be prescribed in legislation or regulations; and, 
• Unlike categorical programs, which target funds for a specific 
activity, recipients undertake at their discretion, a number of 
activities within a broad functional category aimed at addressing 
national objectives.99 
According to a 2014 CRS report, the use of block grants to fund programs 
provides considerable flexibility to the grantees, but this flexibility can make determining 
performance accountability difficult,100 which has resulted in the extensive amount of 
regulation, audits, and concern over how the funding is spent. This issue was addressed 
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during congressional testimony over the grant management process in 2012, before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee.101 Some of 
the FEMA recommendations for improving the grant management process included 
realigning the organization, shortening the budget review process, permitting grant 
reprioritization, and reducing administrative hurdles.102 The issue of reducing 
administrative burden in the grant management process is a concern from local 
government representatives. For example, according to congressional testimony in April 
2014, regarding the current grant structure, “it would be more efficient to award directly 
to the High-Risk Areas. This would eliminate a level of bureaucracy and would get 
funding to the local jurisdictions faster.”103 In addition, although grant eligibility is based 
on the local urban area’s relative risk rating, state administrators,’ per the grant guidance, 
are authorized to use up to 20 percent of the grant award.104 
E. SUMMARY 
The federal grant allocation process has significant implications for state and local 
homeland security preparedness. Given the differences between particularistic and 
universal grant allocation approaches, the UASI program “appears to more rationally 
steer grant resources to those at risk.”105 As Congress has shifted to more risk-based 
grant criteria, this approach seems to be less subject to political influence among 
appropriation committees and aligns funding better than mandated minimum funding 
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levels for all states.106 However, the key aspect of using a risk-based approach is how the 
risk allocation formula is developed and applied since “making grant allocations based on 
risk are only as good as the formula and measurement of risk itself.”107 Consequently, 
what comprises 85 percent of risk and how the grant allocation formula is developed and 
applied affects the funding available to the most populous metropolitan areas. Therefore, 
what is critical in allocating federal resources is ensuring risk is properly aligned with 
funding and the allocation process is validated and transparent. The UASI risk formula 
factors and grant allocation approaches are explored further in the next chapter.  
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IV. FEDERAL ASSISTANCE GRANT ALLOCATION 
METHODOLOGY 
After September 11, 2001, federal homeland security assistance expanded with 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296), which established DHS.108 
This act, amended in 2007 by Pub L. No. 110-53 to implement recommendations of the 
9/11 Commission, authorized a number of DHS grants and mandated that several of the 
grant program allocation methods be based on an analysis of risk.109 The top funded 
homeland security grant program is the UASI, which allocates funding to the nation’s 
largest metropolitan areas. From FYs 2003 to 2010, for example, the UASI program was 
the second highest funded grant program and accounted for $6.5 billion, approximately 
19 percent, of the funding allocated for homeland security grants.110 This chapter 
assesses and evaluates the process by which DHS allocates UASI grant funds.  
In FY 2014, DHS allocated $587 million for UASI homeland security grant 
programs.111 According to United States (U.S.) Code, the purpose of this grant funding is 
“to assist high-risk urban areas in preventing, preparing for, protecting against, and 
responding to acts of terrorism.”112 The 100 most populous MSAs in the United States 
are eligible for UASI grants.113 MSAs are contiguous geographic regions of the United 
States defined by the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as “a large 
population concentration that is integrated with surrounding territory.”114 According to 
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the OMB, MSAs “represent areas in which people reside, work and spend their lives.”115 
MSAs represent regions of the country geographically and economically connected. Each 
fiscal year, the grant administrator allocates UASI grant funding based on an analysis of 
the relative risk of the eligible urban areas.116 Working in conjunction with DHS, the 
grant administrator FEMA conducts an assessment of each of the eligible urban areas 
using the factors described in sections A through H and K:117 
(A) its population, including appropriate consideration of military, 
tourist and commuter populations; 
(B) its population density; 
(C) its history of threats, including whether it has been the target of a 
prior act of terrorism; 
(D) its degree of threat, vulnerability, and consequences related to 
critical infrastructure (for all critical infrastructure sectors) or key 
resources identified by the Administrator or the State homeland 
security plan, including threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences 
related to critical infrastructure or key resources in nearby 
jurisdictions; 
(E)  the most current threat assessments available to the Department; 
(F) whether the State has, or the high-risk urban area is located at or 
near, an international border; 
(G) whether it has a coastline bordering an ocean (including the Gulf 
of Mexico) or international waters; 
(H) its likely need to respond to acts of terrorism occurring in nearby 
jurisdictions; 
(I)  such other factors as are specified in writing by the 
Administrator.118 
The initial assessment of each MSA is based on relative threat, vulnerability, and 
consequences from acts of terrorism.119 In accordance with U.S. Code, DHS uses a risk 
methodology based on the principal elements: 
115 Williams and Riehl, Metropolitan Area Designations by OMB: History, Current Definitions, and 
Uses, CRS–2. 
116 United States Code Subchapter XV-Homeland Security Grants, Section 604: Urban Area Security 
Initiative, 180. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., Section 608, Prioritization, 185. 
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• Threat—likelihood of an attack being attempted by an adversary 
• Vulnerability—likelihood that an attack is successful, given that it is 
attempted 
• Consequence—effect of an event, incident or occurrence120 
• Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence.121  
Although Congress has “stipulated that risk is to be evaluated as a function of T, 
V, and C, … FEMA is free to create the formula by which it estimates consequences and 
how it incorporates T, V, and C into an overall estimate of risk.”122 DHS allocates the 
funding based on ranking the MSA regions by using a variety of factors to assess risk 
further within those geographic locations. These primary factors, as previously described, 
include threat, the vulnerability index and the consequence index. These factors are 
subdivided further as shown in Figure 2. 
Figure 2.  Grant Allocation Factors 
 
Source: Department of Homeland Security, State and Metropolitan Statistical Area Risk 
Informed Allocation Approach: A Guide for FEMA/GPD Stakeholders (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2014), 13. 
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As Figure 2 illustrates, the factors used to rank the MSA regions are weighted, so 
that certain components, such as threats, have greater value in determining a region’s 
overall risk rating. Therefore, a region with higher threats will rank higher on the overall 
threat index. DHS provides the details of how each component of risk is weighted, but 
the data used in every calculation are not available. When comparing MSA populations, 
for example, this information is readily available and referenced by DHS from the United 
States Census Bureau.123 The same is true for economic data and several other 
categories; however, specific data for threats and critical assets are not available. FEMA, 
per 9/11 Act recommendations, bases the risk formula on relative versus absolute risk.124 
The comparison of relative versus absolute risk is provided in Table 2.125 
Table 2.   Relative Risk versus Absolute Risk 
Relative Risk Absolute Risk 
• Measure of risk that represents the 
ratio of risks when compared to 
each other 
• Cannot be used as a “stand-alone” 
risk value – it is meaningful only in 
comparison to other similarly 
constructed risk values  
• Simpler calculation of risk since it 
is not associated with a particular 
scenario so specifics of attack are 
not required  
 
• Level of risk expressed with 
standard units of measurement [e.g., 
lives lost, dollars] that allows for 
independent interpretation without 
comparison to estimates of other 
risks  
• Allows for a “stand-alone” risk 
value  
• Generally associated with a 
particular scenario and requires a 
significant amount of data on attack 
method, target, and probability of 
attack  
 
The relative risk rating allows for the ranking of MSAs since each urban area’s 
risk rating is evaluated against each of the other urban areas. Each component of the 
formula uses its own data source to calculate that MSA’s ranking. For example, an urban 
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area may rank high in population but low in overall threat. The combination and weight 
of each factor results in the overall relative risk rating for that MSA, which determines 
funding allocations.  
A. THREAT COMPONENT 
At 30 percent of the overall weighted score, the threat component is one of the 
largest single factors used in the DHS’s calculation for MSA ranking. This component, 
according to FEMA, considers credible threats to the homeland, as well as threats from 
violent international and domestic terrorism actors.126 The source of the threat 
information is from DHS, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, with input from the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).127 Based on a GAO report, threat in the grant 
allocation methodology comprises urban areas most likely to be targets of attack.128 This 
process is based on the following: 
• Collecting qualitative threat information having a nexus with international 
terrorism or its affiliates 
• Analyzing the threat information to create threat assessments for states and 
urban areas 
• Empanelling intelligence experts to review the threat assessments and 
reach consensus as to the number of threat tiers and the placement of 
urban areas within threat tiers 
• Assigning threat scores to states and each urban area based on their threat 
tier placement 
• Considering threat information in four categories: detainee reporting, 
ongoing plot lines, credible reporting, and relevant investigation 
• Using analytical judgment and discussion to reach consensus as to the 
number of threat tiers and the placement of urban areas within threat 
tiers129 
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Previous CRS reports have “noted that DHS’ efforts to evaluate and analyze 
threats only consider federal government intelligence and investigative information. To 
date, state and local intelligence and investigative information are not systematically 
considered in DHS’s assessment of threats to a given locality.”130 Without further 
transparency in the process, urban areas are unsure of what level of state and local 
intelligence information is included. Since funding is tied to threat information, ensuring 
all the data are included for each region is critical. According to the NRC, “To maximize 
transparency of DHS risk analyses for decision makers, DHS should aim to document its 
risk analyses as clearly as possible and distribute them with as few constraints as 
possible.”131 More transparency will help stakeholders and decision makers better 
understand regional threats and priorities.  
Based on the previously described factors, DHS separates the eligible urban areas 
into four ranking tiers based on assessed level of threat.132 For example, if a specific 
urban area ranks in the top percentage of all the urban areas for risk, and if that urban 
area is included in the next tier, it is ranked with all the other tier two urban areas whether 
it is in the top or bottom quartile of that ranking. Therefore, if an urban area is in a 
specific ranking tier, for risk calculation purposes, it has the same threat level as all other 
urban areas within that tier. Consequently, this ranking process groups all threat risks into 
four tiers and does not delineate within those categories.  
Refining the tier ranking system would help provide more clarity to stakeholders 
and decision makers regarding the level of threats in their urban areas. Since the relative 
threat rating is one of the primary components used to determine the MSA’s overall 
relative risk rating, slight differences in relative threat can have a significant impact on 
urban area funding allocations. Depending on how a particular region’s risk is calculated, 
funding levels will fluctuate, and some urban areas will be affected more than others. 
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Consequently, broad tier comparisons may not accurately reflect the differences between 
regional threat levels. 
B. VULNERABILITY INDEX 
The vulnerability index comprises two equally weighted factors, the targeted 
infrastructure index and the border index. These factors are further detailed in Figure 
3.133  
Figure 3.  Vulnerability Component 
 
 
The targeted infrastructure index is a subset of the DHS Office of Infrastructure 
Protection (IP) Level 1 and Level 2 count and represent the number of Level 1 and Level 
2 assets and systems within sectors that DHS deems terrorists are more likely to 
attack.134 These sectors include aviation, mass transit, oil and natural gas facilities, and 
large public facilities and venues.135 The targeted infrastructure index also includes Level 
1 and Level 2 assets that, regardless of sector, have been subject to specific and credible 
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threats.136 The border index includes three data elements: international borders, border 
crossing, and international waters. This index is primarily based on geographic location 
and the number of passenger crossings into the United States.137 
As explained by FEMA, in addition to other components, the targeted 
infrastructure represents assets and systems that DHS deems more subject to attack, such 
as pipelines and tankers.138 However, similar to the previous discussion on threat, since 
the specific information on how the index is calculated is not available, the transparency 
for stakeholders and decision makers is limited. What is critical, however, is how to 
incorporate rapidly changing threat and vulnerability into the ranking process. For 
example, with the increase in Bakken oil transportation, this level of combustible fuel 
travelling through some already designated high-risk urban areas will increase, and the 
vulnerability index should reflect the increase in threat and the nexus to rail traffic.  
According to Environment and Energy Publishing, “DHS has not followed many 
of the rail provisions laid out in the Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Act of 
2007, leading some security experts to question the agency’s ‘risk-based approach’ to rail 
safety that relies heavily on industry cooperation.”139 Consequently, “the rapid rise of the 
‘unit’ oil train has also exposed gaps in the agency’s approach to securing surface 
transportation.”140 Not all urban areas are equally affected by this issue, and the ranking 
process must be transparent enough so stakeholders and policy makers can understand the 
impact on their region and their MSA ranking, which affects their funding allocation 
when vulnerabilities change.  
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Consequence comprises four factors: population index, economic index, national 
infrastructure index, and national security index. The scope of this section addresses the 
population, economic, and infrastructure indexes. Figure 4 is a chart of how the factors 
are weighted and their component factors.141  
Figure 4.  Consequence Index 
 
Within the MSA ranking process, population is used in several calculations as a 
measure of population density and total population. Both of these factors are mandated in 
the U.S. Code.142 As shown in Figure 4, additional factors used include commuter and 
tourist information. The population index accounts for 30 percent of the overall 
consequence score and is considered the dominant factor.143 The second largest factor for 
consequence is the economic index, which represents 13 percent of the weighting factor. 
Per FEMA, “Economic Index is proportional to the amount of economic disruption that 
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could be caused by a generalized attack on an area.”144 The gross domestic product 
(GDP) is considered a proxy for this measure.145  
The issue regarding the consequence index, as well as the other factors, is what is 
the more critical indicator of risk? Also, how should these factors be weighted? For 
example, how is an economic index of 13 percent relevant for ranking a region? If certain 
urban areas are allocated more grant funding because of their GDP ranking, how does the 
economic index compare with unique geographic vulnerabilities and high-risk assets? 
The issue of weighting factors was addressed by the NRC, “It appears that the choice of 
weightings in these risk assessments, and the parameters in the consequence formulas, are 
chosen in an ad hoc fashion and have not been peer reviewed by technical experts 
external to DHS.”146 Depending on how these weightings are applied, the process will 
impact funding allocations since each urban area ranks differently in each of the various 
weighted categories.  
The national infrastructure index represents five percent of the consequence 
weighting, and accounts for potentially the highest consequence events.147 Per FEMA, 
the national infrastructure index was developed from the DHS IP Office and represents 
the count of Level 1 and Level 2 assets and systems within the MSA.148 According to the 
GAO, Critical infrastructure assets within the MSAs are divided into two levels, “that if 
destroyed or disrupted, could cause significant casualties, major economic losses, or 
widespread and long-term disruptions to national well-being and governance 
capacity.”149 The tiered approach was developed in 2006 through the DHS National 
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Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program “to identify nationally significant critical 
infrastructure each year based on the consequences associated with the disruption or 
destruction of those critical infrastructure.”150 The process to evaluate assets and systems 
for inclusion as tier 1 or 2 is through the framework provided by the DHS National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). NIPP “provides the overarching approach for 
integrating the nation’s critical infrastructure protection and resiliency activities into a 
single national effort.”151 The list of tier 1 and tier 2 assets “identifies nationally 
significant critical infrastructure that DHS can use to enhance decision making, including 
implementing … [FEMA’s] homeland security grant programs.”152 
Given the five percent weighting assigned to the national infrastructure index, 
although these are the highest consequence assets and systems evaluated by the IP Office, 
a region with a high rating in this category, could still receive an overall lower relative 
MSA ranking, based on the weighting score of the other factors. In addition, “DHS does 
not have a process for identifying the impact of changes to the list on its users and has not 
reviewed the impact of these changes on users.”153 According to the GAO, “DHS has not 
validated its approach to developing the list to ensure that it adequately reflects the 
nation’s highest-priority critical infrastructure.”154 The GAO has shown, “Even small 
changes to the NCIPP list counts can have an impact on UASI grant allocations when 
accounting for all the additional inputs considered in FEMA’s risk formula.”155  
Considering the critical impact of this process on FEMA funding decisions, “An 
independent peer review to validate the NCIPP criteria and list development process 
would better position DHS to reasonably assure that, consistent with the NIPP risk 
management framework, federal and state partners that use the NCIPP list have sound 
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information when making risk management and resource allocation decisions.”156 
Without further transparency in the process, urban areas will not have the information 
necessary to ensure grant funding allocations are appropriately applied to reduce their 
region’s overall risk. 
D. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The 9/11 Commission Report recommends “homeland security assistance should 
be based strictly on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.”157 Consequently, 
Congress has specified risk is to be determined by threats, vulnerability, and 
consequences.158 Based on this formula, according to the GAO, “limitations such as the 
absence of a method for measuring variations in vulnerability reduce the vulnerability 
element’s value.”159 In the risk management formula, FEMA “has set vulnerability equal 
to 1.0, effectively removing that factor from the risk equation.”160 Consequently, the 
vulnerabilities as used in the risk model assume each geographic region of the country is 
as vulnerable as any other for terrorism.  
According to the GAO, “Vulnerability is a crucial component of risk assessment 
… DHS needs to measure vulnerability as part of its risk analysis model to capture 
variations in vulnerability across states and urban areas.”161 The issue becomes how to 
include vulnerability in the risk equation. According to the CRS, “A risk assessment 
process used to allocate homeland security assistance would determine that every state 
and locality has some risk, whether terrorism or natural disaster related, and needs some 
amount of funding. This, however, would require DHS to evaluate state and local 
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capabilities, vulnerability, and risk in a manner that accurately reflects the nations’ 
current homeland security environment.”162 The issue is whether DHS, like other fiscally 
constrained government agencies, has the resources to conduct this comprehensive 
evaluation.163 The next chapter provides a case study from the United Kingdom on the 
potential use of direct funding to support local homeland security preparedness in the 
United States.  
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V. UNITED KINGDOM CASE STUDY 
The United States uses a variety of federal grants to fund its homeland security 
programs. One of the largest federally funded grants is the UASI program, which 
provides funding to the nation’s largest urban areas based on risk criteria specified by 
Congress. This program is administered by DHS and FEMA. DHS and FEMA determine 
the grant allocation formula to be applied based on the concept of relative risk. In 2015, 
based on this formula, 28 specific urban areas received homeland security funding.164 
This allocation approach narrows the availability of grant funding to specific urban areas 
regardless of need or national threat priorities affecting other MSAs. According to The 9/
11 Commission Report, “every state and city needs to have some minimum infrastructure 
for emergency response.”165 Consequently, urban areas that have risk but do not rank 
high enough to receive funding may not be able to initiate or sustain homeland security 
efforts.  
In the United States, funding for state and local governments comes primarily 
from sales, property, and income taxes (see Figure 5). As a result, the funding can 
fluctuate widely based on local and regional economic circumstances, which affects 
policing levels and support services. Without dedicated homeland security funding, urban 
areas may not continue to focus on homeland security priorities, especially when revenue 
sources are uncertain for existing programs. Funding from the UASI grant is allocated for 
urban areas deemed at highest risk, but the direct connection to national priorities or 
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strategies is unclear.166 This ambiguity has resulted in the difficulty of determining how 
federal grant funding has reduced risk.167  
Figure 5.  State and Local Government Revenue Sources in the United States 
  
Source: Liz Malm and Ellen Kant, “The Sources of State and Local Tax Revenues,” Tax 
Foundation, January 28, 2013, 1, http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-state-and-local-
tax-revenues. 
Using law enforcement as an example, if a direct funding mechanism was 
established for local police agencies, the federal government could designate policies 
conducive to addressing national priorities and threats. For example, by allocating funds 
based on the top national threats, such as self-radicalization, funding will align directly 
with risk. The current DHS funding process for concentrating risk within the top 28 urban 
areas does not directly align funding with prioritized threat because a variety of factors 
are included in the UASI grant allocation process. Threat is only one of the UASI grant 
allocation factors. Given the limited amount of homeland security funding available, 
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aligning nationally prioritized threats with resources will enable police agencies to focus 
on the most critical and immediate problems.  
The 2014 Quadrennial Report issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
states that the nation’s largest metro regions have still not recovered from the great 
recession.168 Since the current UASI grant allocation approach does not consider need in 
its allocation formula, having a dedicated funding source would ensure resources are 
targeted on homeland security priorities and help improve the capabilities of local law 
enforcement.  
A. UNITED KINGDOM APPROACH 
The United Kingdom offers another approach for allocating grant funding.169 The 
United Kingdom does not have an overarching homeland security agency. Instead, it has 
a variety of government departments that oversee security and counterterrorism issues.170 
These departments coordinate their activities through inter-departmental committees of 
ministers and other government officials.171 The UK’s central-government approach 
directly allocates grants to fund police agencies and specific counterterrorism programs. 
Focusing specifically on police services, this comparison evaluates the U.S.’ risk-based 
approach against the UK’s grant methodology to fund police, intelligence, and 
counterterrorism activities.  
The Home Office, or interior ministry, is the lead department for homeland 
security response, including counterterrorism policy,172 and has “ministerial 
responsibility for the police services in England and Wales.”173 The UK’s central 
government approach to funding police agencies and specific counterterrorism programs 
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is through direct allocation of grants based primarily on four separate sources. These 
sources include: 
• The Police Grant from the Home Office 
• The Revenue Support Grant from the Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) and Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) 
• Redistributed business rates from DCLG and WAG 
• Specific grants from the Home Office174 
The UK funding allocation formula is based on calculations that use various types 
of data, such as population density, to share funding.175 According to the UK Guide to 
Police Allocation Formula (PAF), “The PAF is used to divide the majority of the money 
available for total police funding between forces. The results of the PAF have a 
significant impact on how much money a force will receive in order to police its local 
area. The PAF allocates funding to forces based on their relative need.”176 The PAF “is 
not a calculation of absolute needs, that is, it does not estimate how much each force 
needs independently of other forces.”177 This formula helps to offset local revenue 
differences among agencies. 
According to a CRS report, “Policing in the UK is largely decentralized. There 
are 43 regional police forces in England and Whales.”178 Since the central government 
provides substantial funding for the national police force, the central government 
maintains considerable control through the Home Office Secretary.179 The allocation 
“model is designed to … provide a good statistical prediction of relative police workload 
across the country.”180 Local police authorities, however, maintain operational control 
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through directly elected police and crime commissioners.181 Although grant funding is 
allocated based on specific crime category statistics, each metropolitan area is free to 
spend the money based on its assessment of local priorities.182 In addition to grant 
allocation formulas, grant funding is specifically allocated to areas considered in the 
national police interest, such as counter terrorism. For example, out of the 2015/16 Home 
Office Police main grant of £4,309 million pounds, approximately 13 percent is allocated 
for counter terrorism.183 The Minister of State for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims 
can make the annual determination of which categories to allocate the funding.184  
B. POLICE FUNDING ANALYSIS 
The UK’s funding mechanism, although complex, allows the central government 
to target specific spending.185 According to Timothy Brain, “Funding is provided by two 
government departments, Home Office and Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLF), … and by individual police authorities (council tax).”186 In 
addition, according to the briefing paper, besides general grants “there are a variety of 
specific grants, such as those for security and public finance initiative projects.”187 Figure 
6 provides an example of the principal police funding sources by category.  
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Figure 6.  UK Principal Funding Sources 2011–2012 
 
Source: Timothy Brain, “Police Funding (England & Wales) 2011–2012, Police Briefing 
Paper, No. 1, Universities’ Police Science Institute, August 2011, 2, http://www.openeye 
communications.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/UPSI-Police-Briefing-Paper-No-1-12-
Aug-11.pdf. 
The central government accounts for 76 percent of total police funding in the 
United Kingdom (Figure 6).188 The remaining council tax share of 24 percent is paid 
through local government revenue. This percent has doubled since 1995.189 The Home 
Office share provides the largest funding source based on a needs-based police funding 
formula.190 Based on the limitations of available data, the UK’s allocation formula does 
not include every factor that affects relative policing need, so a Police Allocation 
Formula Working Group (PAWG) oversees the modifications to the process.191 
According to the UK Guide to Police Allocation, the PAWG is an official group 
comprised of various central government and police authorities.192 The process, which 
includes public consultation, “ensures that the formula is scrutinized and can be discussed 
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by a wide range of stakeholders.”193 Most of the specific grants, except for security 
targeted programs, are also distributed by formula; consequently, the Metropolitan Police 
Service (MPS) receives 63 percent of the security grant.194 Within the specific grants 
category, counter terrorism comprises approximately 54 percent of the amount 
allocated.195  
The UK allocation formula is based on total police workload including crime 
types and police enforcement activities.196 For example, more funding is allocated for 
investigating violent crime and policing special events. Although funding is based on 
these types of factors, police authorities are free to use it according to their specific 
assessment of local priorities.197 For allocation of specific counter terrorism funding, 
however, the money is considered “ring-fenced” or restricted and can only be used for 
targeted activities.198 For security reasons, the specific allocations, however, are not 
available in the public domain.199  
The UK parliamentary system helps influence government decisions regarding 
homeland security priorities.200 According to a CRS report: 
The Prime Minister and his Cabinet are drawn from the political party 
with a majority in the House of Commons, the elected chamber of 
Parliament. As such, there is no strict separation of the executive and 
legislative branches of government in the UK. The Prime Minister, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the Cabinet ministers prepare the 
government’s budget and set overall departmental budget priorities and 
spending limits. Given that the UK government has a majority in 
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Parliament, the government’s proposed budgetary levels are not usually 
contested in the same way as they often are in the United States.201 
Consequently, the direct allocation of funding and the central government’s overall 
budget strategy helps local police agencies maintain greater program continuity.  
The UK approach, in combination with intelligence-led policing policies, directly 
aligns funding with the greatest threats. For example, British Military Intelligence (MI5) 
works directly with the local government police agencies to administer terrorist-related 
cases. MI5, as case manager, helps local governments manage counterterrorism 
investigations and arrests.202 Aligning the funding with national priorities helps address 
threats directly and having designated MI5 case managers ensures continuity within the 
metro police agencies.  
C. APPLICABILITY FOR THE UNITED STATES 
Would the UK system work in the United States given the large number and 
diversity of police agencies? In contrast to the UK’s 43 metro police agencies, the United 
States has approximately 16,000 police agencies.203 Most of these agencies are 
comprised of small police forces of 10 employees or less and have diverse standards.204 
To be feasible in the United States, a direct allocation approach could be adjusted to 
focus on the top 100 MSAs. A direct allocation formula, using criteria already established 
by public law could be used, with specific emphasis on national threats and priorities. By 
focusing on the 100 largest MSAs, which includes over 200 million U.S. residents, direct 
allocations would provide a specific level of resources dedicated to homeland security 
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functions.205 Other criteria, such as crime statistics, could be included in the formula, so 
the program has a dual purpose similar to the UK approach.  
By providing direct funding from the central government, financial variations in 
regional or local economies can be reduced. In addition, for counterterrorism funding, 
assigning funding directly to police agencies reduces the administrative burden of 
intermediary agencies and helps establish priorities for national needs. Through the direct 
funding mechanism to local police agencies, the federal government can designate 
policies conducive to addressing national priorities and threats. For example, by 
allocating funding based on the top national threats, such as self-radicalization, funding 
will be directly aligned with this risk.  
However, using a direct federal government allocation method would leave local 
programs susceptible to budget cuts if federal programs changed. If the programs, 
however, are no longer a priority, then the cuts will reflect the ongoing risk and threat 
environment. Given the ongoing threat picture, the direct allocation of resources to local 
law enforcement will provide specific policies and help standardize best practices. In 
addition, a transparent formula-driven allocation process, based on national threat and 
regional need, will help reduce the political influence on grant allocations.  
Since the U.S. grant allocation formula assumes vulnerability is the same 
throughout the nation, capability differences among MSAs to address vulnerabilities are 
not included in the grant formula.206 Vulnerable regions with fewer capabilities are not 
accounted for in the relative risk rating. By including factors for relative need, more 
consistency would result in national preparedness planning.  
Previous competitive grant programs administered by the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) have shown how funding can directly impact local resources. For example, the 
Community Oriented Policing (COP) Hiring program provided direct funding for adding 
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local police officers. The Cops-in-Schools program was another direct funding approach 
to place officers in local schools. The funding for these programs has been significantly 
reduced since their initial inception; however, the potential still exists. Both programs 
were competitive grants, however, and by using the UASI model, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security could designate funding levels for MSAs through a direct allocation 
grant formula that focuses on national priorities. Direct funding, for example, police 
positions within specific regions would help provide resources to leverage local law 
enforcement programs.  
Since risk-based funding allocation amounts are made at the discretion of DHS, 
the focus of the funding could then be adjusted each year based on changes to potential 
threats.207 For example, the program could initially focus on conducting some level of 
community outreach throughout the United States. If a different threat becomes a higher 
priority, then the following year’s program can be adjusted to reflect greater emphasis on 
other priorities. By having a dedicated funding mechanism baseline, each urban area 
could have some level of resources dedicated to homeland security threats. For example, 
if self-radicalization is at the highest threat priority, directly allocating resources to police 
agencies with the focus of addressing this problem would work on several levels, 
community policing and community engagement. This approach would be useful not 
only for addressing the threat of self-radicalization but also for enhancing community 
support and outreach. Creating a direct funding approach with specific national priorities 
will establish more clear policies for addressing local and regional threats. The focus of 
the program could change based on the recommendations of the DHS Secretary, thus 
providing more clearly defined connections with funding.  
Another benefit is the potential expanded use of best practices. Various DOJ 
programs have historically helped increase community engagement through community 
policing grants. In addition, programs, such as value-based initiatives sponsored by the 
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DOJ, support partnerships between law enforcement and faith-based communities.208 
This approach is consistent with the UK’s philosophy of policing and community 
engagement, which is made possible by its funding support. The existing grant 
management structures at DHS, FEMA, and the DOJ could administer the programs. No 
additional government support units are necessary.  
Based on an analysis of the United Kingdom, the specific policy 
recommendations for consideration in the United States are as follows: 
• Develop grant assistance programs for local police agencies to address 
specific national priority programs, such as countering violent extremism. 
• Assign the direct allocation of funding, thereby reducing financial 
intermediaries. 
• Include needs-based assessments of MSAs in assistance allocation 
programs so local capabilities are consistent.  
• Maintain program funding sustainability with changes to annual threat 
priorities. 
Each metropolitan statistical area has some level of risk, and funding homeland security 
programs based on needs and priorities will ensure more MSAs focus on high priority 
homeland security threats. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The allocation of grant funding in the United Kingdom provides another option 
for distributing homeland security grants. Although the UK police allocation formula is 
complicated, certain aspects of the program are worth considering in the United States. 
By using a direct formula driven process, the funding is provided directly to police 
agencies instead of through federal grants administered by state agencies. This method of 
funding reduces the administrative burden on the grantee and streamlines the allocation 
process. In addition, the United Kingdom uses a formula allocation process based on 
relative need and work load between agencies, which ensures the more equitable 
distribution of funds for local governments with different levels of capabilities. Given the 
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variability of police resources, training, and capabilities among the nation’s largest police 
agencies, a formula-driven approach for directly allocating homeland security grants has 
certain benefits. These benefits include program stability, training consistency, national 
threat prioritization, and best practices.  
Having resources to establish and maintain homeland security programs will 
improve the capabilities of local law enforcement outreach and community engagement. 
Individual police agencies can then establish programs to coordinate resources within 
their communities targeting specific priorities. Moreover, the expansion of direct funding 
to MSAs will help address national priorities. Based on the final report of the President’s 
Task Force On 21st Century Policing, the final recommendation: “Work with the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security to ensure the community policing tactics in state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are incorporated into the role of homeland 
security.”209 Consequently, direct funding for local law enforcement agencies is the first 
step to achieve this recommendation. 
                                                 
209 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 




Based on the Office of Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine, the key 
principles listed for effective risk management include unity of effort, transparency, 
adaptability, practicality, and customization.210 According this doctrine: 
Transparency is important for the analysis that contributes to decision 
making. It includes the assumptions that supported that analysis, the 
uncertainty involved with it, and the communications that follow that 
decision. Risk management should not be a ‘black box’ exercise where 
analysis is hidden.211 
This analysis is especially critical for determining MSA ratings for UASI 
programs and should include the most recent local, state, and federal information to 
determine the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences accurately from a terrorist event. 
The DHS doctrine further states, “Those impacted by a risk management approach should 
be able to validate the integrity of the approach.”212 Determining the process used to 
weight FEMA’s risk-formula components ultimately impacts how the funding allocations 
are determined. Validating the factors used will help ensure the appropriate mix of 
variables is included when assessing the relative risk scores. Based on the funding 
methodologies covered in this thesis, a summary of the recommendations for DHS and 
FEMA is provided. 
A. THREAT COMPONENT 
Provide transparency in the risk management process regarding information input 
to ensure stakeholders and policy makers have a better perspective and understanding of 
the threats, thereby ensuring all the critical data is included for each MSA. By detailing 
“its risk analyses as clearly as possible and distributing them with as few constraints as 
possible,” as suggested by the NRC, DHS can ensure the threat index will provide a more 
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thorough process for resource allocation.213 DHS should consider providing a summary 
report or brief outlining in general terms the types of threat information considered in 
ranking each of the urban areas, so each region has a better understanding of what factors 
DHS considers the highest priorities. These reports will assist each urban area, especially 
the lesser funded regions with fewer available resources, with aligning resources with 
general threat information and will be useful for completing threat and hazard 
identification and risk assessments. 
Categorize the threat information into more defined categories so individual 
differences among urban areas are more specifically provided on a scalable range, which 
will help provide more clarity to stakeholders and decision makers and provide a more 
specific measure of relative threat. Even slight differences in relative risk levels can 
affect funding allocations. By using a scalable methodology versus four tiers, the relative 
threat measure will be more accurately reflected in the risk formula and grant allocations, 
since the threat component is the largest weighted factor used in determining the MSAs’ 
overall relative risk rating.  
B. VULNERABILITY INDEX 
Incorporate more transparency and flexibility in the process to provide urban 
areas with a better understanding of what targeted infrastructure sectors are included and 
to ensure specific information on rapidly changing threat and vulnerability levels is 
incorporated into the ranking process. This transparency and analyses will help 
stakeholders and policy makers better understand the impact to their region and their 
MSA ranking. 
C. CONSEQUENCE INDEX 
Provide validation of the weighting factors used in the risk assessment and 
consequence formulas. The U.S. Code outlines the factors that must be used for 
prioritizing funding, but no specific guidance is provided on the weight given to each 
component. An independent validation of the selection of formula weightings and 
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allocation parameters by technical experts would substantiate the process.214 This 
validation would also provide more transparency to the process by documenting how it 
was derived.  
D. NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE INDEX 
Include an evaluation process to validate this component. The critical 
consequence of the assets and systems included in the index should be validated and 
reviewed, considering how even small changes in the asset list can have an impact on 
UASI allocations. In addition, validating the process for developing the critical 
infrastructure list is critical to ensure it adequately reflects the nation’s most critical 
assets, so stakeholders and decision makers “have sound information when making risk 
management and resource allocation decisions.”215 Through an independent peer review, 
as recommended by the GAO, DHS would be in a better position to assure the nation’s 
highest-priority assets have been included.216 Per U.S. Code, this index should also take 
into consideration, “consequences related to critical infrastructure or key resources in 
nearby jurisdictions.”217 The impact, for example, of interconnected infrastructure 
systems may have significant consequences in other jurisdictions. 
E. UNITED KINGDOM GRANT ALLOCATION APPROACH 
The UK’s allocation approach provides another option for aligning grant funds 
with budgets and threat priorities. In the U.S. grant allocation approach, capabilities are 
verified through the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) 
process after the grant award is made.218 The THIRA process includes an “estimation of 
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resources needed to meet the capability targets.”219 The UK model, on the other hand, 
uses a distribution formula that includes relative need among metropolitan areas, and it 
includes considerations for force levels compared to estimated work load per 
population.220 Therefore, differences in capabilities are accounted for before the grant 
awards are determined. In the U.S. risk allocation formula, FEMA “has set vulnerability 
equal to 1.0, effectively removing that factor from the risk equation.”221 Therefore, 
relative resource levels among MSAs to address vulnerability differences are not 
considered in the U.S. allocation formula. 
Based on the UK model, by establishing an official risk allocation governance 
group in the United States, stakeholders could provide input to the allocation formula, 
and modifications to the formula would reflect changing priorities and existing 
vulnerabilities. In addition, by including subject matter experts on the governance 
committee, objective peer review, documentation, and validation will improve its 
scientific application.222  
The UK grant system directly allocates funding to police agencies. The DOJ 
Community Oriented Policing Program is an example of a grant-funded program in the 
United States that provides direct funding to law enforcement for the specific purpose of 
community policing. Using this approach for UASI funding especially for smaller grant 
awards that do not require as much state administrative support will save the urban areas’ 
overhead costs by streamlining the process, which is grant funding that would otherwise 
be allocated to the grant’s administrative agency. Consequently, subject to the discretion 
of the DHS Secretary, expanding the direct allocation of grant awards to lesser funded 
urban areas will provide additional preparedness resources through existing budgets, 
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since overhead is reduced. Secondly, establishing the direct allocation of grant awards for 
specific programmatic purposes, such as the countering violent extremism or determining 
regional vulnerability, will directly align homeland security funding with national threat 
priorities and promote agency collaboration, since urban areas are required to coordinate 
activities among agencies as part of grant governance. 
A pilot of this program, modeled after the UK and U.S. DOJ programs could be 
tested for applicability and effectiveness. Additionally, allocating a portion of next year’s 
UASI grant allocation for direct funding of local preparedness will leverage resources 
through expanded program partnerships. As the national threat picture changes, the 
program funding and focus can change by fiscal year; however, a stable funding structure 
will be in place. According to CRS recommendations published in 2007, “terrorist threats 
are dynamic and evolve over time; some might argue the risk assessment methodology 
and attendant grant allocation process should be as agile as the adversary against which 
its resources are directed.”223 The direct allocation of grant funding, based on current 
threat priorities, can be refocused each year and will provide a stable yet streamlined and 
flexible approach to leveraging limited resources across metropolitan statistical areas. 
F. FUTURE RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS 
Evaluating the efficacy of a direct funding model for homeland security programs 
is necessary to determine whether this type of program can be duplicated nationally. 
Other areas for future research consideration are assessing the optimal funding allocation 
levels for MSAs. Currently, grant funding allocations are made based on the discretion of 
DHS.224 Evaluating how the funding levels are determined based on relative risk levels 
will provide more clarity to the process.  
Further research evaluating the differences in vulnerabilities and capabilities 
among urban areas may help to allocate funds more effectively. For example, how do the 
response capabilities of a high-risk urban area that has been able to buy down risk 
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through homeland security funding compare to a lower risk urban area with fewer 
response capabilities? Terrorism threats are subjective, in the sense that human behavior 
is determining the targets. Regions of the country with vulnerability gaps that do not have 
the necessary preparedness resources are less capable of addressing threats. A basic 
evaluation of preparedness capabilities could be accomplished by comparing force levels 
among urban areas using metrics, such as police, fire and public health capability levels. 
The UASI grant funds the 28 urban areas at highest risk.225 How does the grant allocation 
formula account for risk that has been reduced through improved local preparedness and 
response capabilities? For example, a lower ranked urban area with fewer capabilities 
may be at higher risk because of lack of resources to address threats. Force analyses 
studies for cities, similar to the UK model, would indicate which local governments are 
able to provide minimum resource capabilities for specific threat scenarios. In the United 
States, THIRAs, which assess capability resources, are required for the MSAs that 
receive grant funding. Future research should address the preparedness of the lower risk 
unfunded MSAs, which do not complete THIRAs. 
MSA resource levels vary considerably in the United States. In 2014, New York 
City, for example, with a population of 8,491,079226 has a sworn and civilian police force 
of 48,952 or approximately one position per 173 residents.227 The city of Los Angeles, 
on the other hand, with a population 3,928,864228 has a sworn and civilian police force of 
13,706 or one position per 287 residents.229 One urban area is at higher risk, but based on 
this simple comparison, the other has fewer resources and receives considerably less 
funding. How do these types of differences correlate among the nation’s top 100 urban 
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areas? Further study using the risk model and relative capability levels would help define 
which urban areas, although at lower risk levels, are actually significantly less capable of 
responding to major threat scenarios. To conduct this research, the top 100 urban areas 
could be evaluated in terms of risk, capabilities and vulnerability gaps. Due to the 
subjective nature of terrorism events, understanding relative force level comparisons 
among urban areas is critical for analyzing national preparedness. If each region of the 
United States is vulnerable to terrorism, then evaluating capabilities among the MSAs 
should be a priority for future research. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The President’s budgets in FYs 2013 and 2014 proposed establishing a National 
Preparedness Grant Program that consolidates 16 grants into a single program to improve 
effectiveness; however, Congress did not approve the grant consolidation proposal.230 
Consequently, changing the grant process to allocate funding into one risk-based 
allocation program to improve grant management does not appear to be an option. 
FEMA, however, can independently initiate a variety of options to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of its grant programs.  
Recommendations presented in this thesis are some approaches that could be 
applied to improve the grant allocation process. First, by validating the weighting factors 
used to determine the relative risk rankings through an independent peer review, funding 
allocations will better align with risk. Second, by providing more transparency into the 
threat and vulnerability assessment process, local urban areas will be assured their 
relative risk rankings reflect the latest threat information and will have a better overall 
understanding of their resource gaps. Also, by providing a more flexible process to 
account for potential threats or trends, urban areas can more appropriately realign grant 
funds and programs with vulnerabilities. Using expert peer reviews to validate the critical 
asset criteria and development process will result in better risk management and resource 
allocation decisions. Lastly, evaluating the direct allocation of funding for urban areas 
                                                 
230 Maurer, National Preparedness: FEMA Has Made Progress, but Additional Steps Are Needed to 
Improve Grant Management and Assess Capabilities, 6.  
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based on the UK model may help to align needs with funding more effectively to enhance 
program capabilities. This approach, depending on the discretion of DHS, could help 
provide a flexible grant allocation model to address the evolving threat environment. The 
grant funding process would be more efficient, since a layer of program administration is 
removed from the process, and funding is applied directly to the metropolitan statistical 
area, thereby ensuring alignment of funding with risk. Addressing these issues will help 
urban areas better understand the grant allocation process to build and sustain 
programmatic needs.  
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